We document large-scale reversal of privatization in China-local governments taking back shares in a quarter of previously privatized firms. Politicians who are not affiliated with any of the dominant political factions are more likely to waver under pressure and adopt renationalization. The failure to adhere to the privatization scheme reduces productivity and raises labor redundancy and firm leverage. The policy reversal casts doubt on the notion that autocracies have advantages in policy implementation: politicians without factional affiliation are disadvantaged in the promotion process and are more sensitive to unemployment pressure. JEL Classifications: G32, H11, P31, L22
Introduction
Are autocracies superior in implementing economic policies than democracies?
After all, since autocrats get their power through coercion, not election, it seems they may be good at pushing economically sound policies that might be politically costly under democracy. For example, Gary Becker states that:
"Visionary leaders can accomplish more in autocratic than democratic governments because they need not heed legislative, judicial, or media constraints in promoting their agenda…Visionaries in democracies can accomplish much sometimes… However, their accomplishments are usually constrained by due process that includes legislative, judicial, and interest group constraints." (Becker 2010).
The experience of Taiwan, Singapore, South Korea, and more recently, China, seems to support the view that, when ruled by visionary leaders, autocracies can be efficient in promoting economic growth. As a comparison, democracies face far more obstacles in policy formation. 1 The idea of a benevolent autocrat henceforth appears to be appealing, at least when he decides to adopt economic policies that have proved to be effective.
In this paper we refute the notion that the authoritarian nature of an autocracy puts it in advantage in adhering to good economic policies. We study China, perhaps the most economically successful autocracy. We document large-scale "renationalization": local governments re-possessing ownership stakes in a quarter of previously privatized firms. Thus although privatization improves firm firm efficiency in general (see Megginson and Netter, 2001 for a comprehensive review), local politicians in China fail to adhere to it. We find that such policy reversals are largely driven by unemployment concerns, and that officials with NO affiliation with the major political factions of the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) are more likely to reverse the course of privatization. The Princelings, those officials born into political families, appear to be the strongest faction and are least likely to waiver under pressure.
Following renationalization, firms experienced reductions in profitability and productivity, along with increases in labor redundancy and leverage. There are strong political incentives behind the trade-off between efficiency and stability: we find that factional ties boost the promotion likelihood of politicians, and that those officials lacking strong patronage will find their promotion prospectus more sensitive to local unemployment than to economic growth. They naturally care more about avoiding social unrest than about making economic achievements.
Politicians in autocracies such as China are not constrained by an electorate, yet their survival depends on their selectorate (Bueno de Mesquita et al, 2003) . Although privatization enhances efficiency in the long run, it may generate unemployment and social instability in the short run. Politicians in charge of the privatization process risk the probability of upsetting the top autocrat before reaping the benefits. This then leads to policy distortions and policy reversals, and in turn generates economic inefficiencies. While autocracies usually have disastrous economic outcomes under incapable leaders, our results suggest that even a visionary autocrat may find his vision fail to materialize.
We add to the literature on the relationship between political systems and economic growth. Most advanced economies are democracies, and many countries experienced democratization after their economy took off. Earlier modernization theory argues that economic growth leads to democracy (Lipset 1959) . Recently, Acemoglu et al (2008) find that the correlation between income and democracy disappears after controlling for country fixed effect, and there is no causal relationship between income and democracy. Acemoglu et al (2017) further find that democratizations in the past 50 years increase GDP per capita by about 20% in the long run ， and that democracy promotes economic growth by encouraging investment, increasing schooling, inducing economic reforms, improving the provision of public goods, and reducing social unrest. An interesting issue related to these findings is that if a benevolent autocrat could mimic these policies and achieve even more due to his authority. As Ferguson (2011) suggests, perhaps autocrats can simply download the "killer apps" that have proved to be important for the success of the West. This paper opens up the black box of how politicians implement economic policies in an autocracy and our results show that the power struggle in a non-democratic setting may actually hinder policy implementation, and that the top-down system in an autocracy is not as efficient as it seems to be even if the top autocrat has the right vision. economists, e.g. free trade, may also face the possibility of being reversed.
Institutional Background and Hypotheses Development
Since late 1970s, the CCP has instituted a tournament-type promotion system, which includes linking an official's promotion to his/her performance in supporting economic growth and maintaining social stability ('harmony') in a region (e.g., Bo, 2007; Li and Zhou, 2005) . These policies are combined with mandatory retirement ages for officials working at different levels, which have led to the changing of guards from the top down every decade (e.g., Li, 1998 These facts about China's political system and privatization help us frame our empirical tests. We are interested in how the structure of the political system affects politicians' policy choices. Politicians calculate their own benefits and costs and may seek sub-optimal policies. In particular, the privatization of SOEs, despite its general positive effect in improving efficiency, faces considerable constraints and incurs social, political and economic costs, such as possible social instability caused by unemployment. Thus, the privatization process is affected by political concerns of local politicians. Without factional support, politicians might be more risk-averse and are more sensitive to the pressure resulted from layoffs and possible social unrest.
Factional politics is a norm in many countries, including modern democracies (Persico et al., 2007) , and they are more common in the absence of full democracy (Markevich and Zhuravskaya, 2011) . We focus on party officials that hold the highest position at the provincial level, i.e., provincial party secretary. China has 31 provinces, offering a wide range of cross-sectional differences in economic development and various dimensions of institutions. Under the supervision of the central government, these provinces are regarded as fairly independent economic units and provincial leaders are not involved with managing other provinces' economies and policy setting.
Within a province, the party secretary, along with the governor, oversees the entire economy and monitors officials at lower levels (e.g., cities and counties).
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The corporate event we look at is re-nationalization, defined to be local governments (within a province) regaining ownership stakes in privatized firms. We expect party officials without strong support and protection from senior leaders to be more concerned about the short-run costs (e.g., unemployment) than the long-run benefits (e.g., higher productivity) of privatization. Hence, we hypothesize that the provincial party secretaries with no affiliation with any of the three factions are more likely to support re-nationalization in their provinces so as to lower or stop rising unemployment rates.
Our next set of hypotheses relate to the effects of re-nationalization on firm performance. Based on the vast body of empirical evidence on privatization in China and elsewhere, we hypothesize that re-nationalization has adverse effects on firm's performance as measured by profitability and labor productivity. Since re-nationalization is not a random event, our main empirical strategy is to use an IV model and a two-stage least square procedure (2SLS) to study the effects of re-nationalization on performance. An official's affiliation with a particular political as instruments for re-nationalization.
Theories of political economy stipulate that politicians can benefit from economic policies even if they reduce efficiency. Politically driven economic policies are not a new phenomenon in China: politicians, out of career concerns, can take ill-conceived policies even if they may lead to dire consequences. Kung and Chen (2011) show that provincial politicians' rank can explain a significant part of the high death rates during China's Great Famine, 1959 -1961 . They find excessively high tax and procurement rates (and thus high death rates) in provinces governed by lower-ranked officials, who had a stronger incentive to please the Party's Central
Committee via contributions in the form of tax income and possessed goods. In our context, one benefit of re-nationalization is lower unemployment rates, an important indicator of "social harmony," even if re-nationalization leads to worse performance of the firms. Hence, in our final set of tests we explore the impact of unemployment on the politicians' promotion perspectives.
Overall, these tests will shed light on whether Chinese politicians could adhere to a policy agenda, and the economic and political effects of their choices. The answers to these questions will enhance our understanding of the working of an autocracy.
Data and Results
Our main data source is the Annual Survey of Industrial Firms (ASIF) released by the National Bureau of Statistics of China for the period 1998-2007, which contains all SOEs and non-SOEs with annual sales over RMB 5 million. Among all the existing databases on Chinese corporate sectors, this is by far the most comprehensive one for all types of firms with financial and accounting data. A firm's ownership type is updated each year in the database. In particular, for each state ownership stake, the database specifies the owner's name (i.e., which government branch or agency) and administrative rank. We restrict our sample to firms that were 100% owned by local government as of the end of 1998 and went through a privatization process afterwards. The firms that remain private after the initial privatization process serve as the natural 'control group' for privatized firms that were later 're-nationalized.' We exclude firms that are owned by the central government:
provincial level officials have no control over these companies and our focus is on the influence of local government officials on corporate sectors. We also drop firms without sufficient information on key variables. Our final sample contains 4,727 firms over the period 1998-2007.
A state-owned firm (as of 1998) is privatized if its state ownership stake drops below 100% after 1998. After the initial privatization, there are three possible outcomes for the firm in terms of ownership structure: 1) its state ownership stake remains the same; 2) further privatization, i.e., state ownership continues to fall; and 3) the state ownership stake increases (re-nationalization). Specifically, a firm is re-nationalized if the state ownership stake increases following the initial privatization. 4 As such, 1,212 firms (25.6%) of our sample SOEs experienced a reversal of privatization, and the average duration between privatization and re-nationalization is about 2 years. Table 1 compares re-nationalized firms and privatized SOEs that are not re-nationalized. Data is obtained for the period after the initial privatization but before local governments regain control of these firms. The average size of the state ownership stakes of re-nationalized firms is 43.14% before the government takeover, far greater than that of SOEs remaining privatized (17.33%). Re-nationalized firms are larger, have higher leverage ratios, lower labor productivity and profitability; these firms also employ more workers and account for a higher share of workforce in local labor markets. Overall, these crude comparisons show that firms that are re-nationalized by local governments appear to be less efficient and in worse financial conditions than the rest of the privatized SOEs but play a more important role in the local labor markets. Table 1 also compares the privatization process of the two groups of firms in Panel B. A common problem among all SOEs is low labor productivity in part due to excessive work force. Hence, one of the major changes through privatization is the reduction in labor force and enhanced productivity. We construct the variable 'Layoff' sales increase by only 18.8% after privatization, as compared to an improvement of 30.2% for the other firms. We also find similar results for changes in labor productivity with re-nationalized firms displaying a smaller improvement. These comparisons further indicate that the privatization process for firms that are later re-nationalized is not as complete as that of the other firms, and they do not experience the same level of improvement in operation following privatization. We hypothesize that officials without any factional affiliation (and thus strong political support) are more sensitive to issues that may jeopardize social stability, e.g.
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unemployment. Therefore, they will have a stronger incentive to generate clear signs of 'social harmony,' possibly at the expense of structural economic reforms. Figure 3 plots the number of provincial leaders among the four groups (three factions and the 'no faction' group). There is a downward trend in the proportion of provincial leaders' without factional affiliation over our sample period. Not surprisingly, after Mr. Hu Panel C of Table 1 relates the frequency of re-nationalization (of firms in a province) to the identity and association of the highest ranked official-the party secretary in the province. In provinces where the party secretary has no ties to any political faction, 9.29% of the privatized firms are re-nationalized. However, when the official is affiliated with one of the three factions, only 5.58% of the privatized firms are taken over by the local government (the difference between the two means is significant at 1%). These results provide preliminary evidence on the influence of factional politics and the status of the provincial party secretary on the likelihood of local firms being re-nationalized.
Determinants of Renationalization
We first examine the determinants of firms' re-nationalization by estimating the following Probit model:
where RN i,t takes the value of 1 if firm i is re-nationalized in year t, and 0 otherwise.
We drop all the observations for a firm after re-nationalization; we also drop observations before the initial privatization, as the firm does not face the choice of re-nationalization at that point. the observation in 1998 (first year of our sample period) is dropped. As a result of this sampling procedure, we have a total of 15,266 firm-year observations, and the number of unique firms is 4,727. We cluster standard errors by province so as to allow for possible correlations among error terms from firms located in the same province.
Our key explanatory variable is the political status of the party secretary of the province. We measure this by a dummy variable which indicates if he/she is affiliated with one of the three main political factions within the CCP.
Vector X in Eq. (1) is a set of lagged firm controls, including firm size (log of book assets), leverage ratio, profitability (return on sales, or ROS), the size of local government's ownership stake (State Share) and its squared term, labor productivity, and the importance of the firm in the local labor market (Employment Share). We also view the extent of labor force reduction following privatization (the variable "Layoff" that measures the percentage drop in the labor force since privatization) as a factor for re-nationalization. To control for the potential impact of political connection, we include a variable that captures the administrative rank of the firm prior to its privatization. In addition, we include a set of year, province, and industry indicators (γ t , ρ p , ϛ j ) in all the models. when leverage increases by one standard deviation, the probability of re-nationalization increases by 1.61 percentage points. Firms' profitability (ROS), however, does not appear to affect their likelihood of re-nationalization.
Second, firms with larger local government ownership stakes (coefficient significant at the 1% level in all the models), and firms that have not laid off a large number of workers (significant at 5% in all the models) are significantly more likely to be renationalized by local governments. For instance, when the layoff rate, or the percentage of workers released from full-employment status after privatization (but before re-nationalization), falls by one standard deviation, the probability of re-nationalization rises by 1.02 percentage points. Given the unconditional probability of a firm re-nationalized by the local government being 8.1% for the whole sample, the result is also economically meaningful.
The above results suggest that the size of the labor force of the firm and the extent of privatization play important roles in the government's decision to re-possess the control of privatized firms. Re-nationalization of these firms can have greater benefits for the officials in that the re-nationalized firms can employ more workers thus help stabilizing the local labor market. Further, the process of re-nationalization of these firms can perhaps be accomplished at lower costs since the government still maintains a large, albeit minority ownership stake of the privatized firms. Government stake has a non-monotonic affect on the likelihood of re-nationalization: its squared term has a negative sign (coefficient significant at the 1% level in all models), suggesting that when the government holds an overwhelming position in the firm, there is no need to further increase its ownership stakes.
The impact of factional affiliation. A key innovation of our study is to examine the role of party officials in the organization of corporate sectors, and the results from re-nationalized (Column 1, significant at 5%). Considering that the (unconditional)
probability of re-nationalization is 7.9% in the whole sample, this suggests that political status and factional support of Party Secretary at the provincial level can explain a large part of the re-nationalization process.
Omitted variables. In Column 2 of Table 2 , we deal with the concern that the estimates may be affected by the omitted circumstances faced by the politician. We include a few variables that describe the institutional environment of the province.
First, a larger share of SOEs in the province indicates less private sector development in the region. Second, the unemployment rate is a primary measure of social stability in the province. Third, we include an index based on survey data from Fan and Wang (2009) that measures the degree of government interference into corporate sectors; a higher index indicates less government intrusion in the corporate sectors and better protection of (private) property rights. 6 We also include the growth rates of provincial GDP.
The provincial level controls also come in as expected. For example, firms located in regions with more government intrusion of corporate sectors (lower Institution index), higher unemployment rates, and greater share of SOEs in the local economies are more likely to be re-nationalized. If the Institution index drops by one standard deviation-roughly equivalent to moving from Jiangsu, a developed coastal province with a high institutional score, to Shaanxi, an underdeveloped inland province with a low score, the probability of re-nationalization rises by 0.29 percentage points. These results are consistent with those firm-level factors, suggesting that unemployment is a major concern for provincial officials, and these officials are more likely to 'interfere' with private sectors if their general influence in the local economy is greater. By contrast, GDP growth (prior to re-nationalization) and fiscal status of the government is not related to the likelihood of re-nationalization.
Finally, another factor that may affect re-nationalization is corruption: private owners may collude with politicians when they sell their stakes to the government.
Although we do not have data on transaction prices, we try to control for this by including a regional corruption index in column 2. As expected, a more corrupt environment, measured by the frequency of exposed graft cases, is associated with a higher likelihood of re-nationalization.
Overall, the results imply that the decision to re-nationalize is not made entirely based on efficiency enhancement or profit maximization (e.g., for non-state shareholders of the firms). Table 3 shows that being affiliated with any of the three factions reduces the probability of renationalization, and that the coefficient of the Princeling group is much larger than the coefficients of the other two factions. This suggests that, possibly because of their inherited political capital, politicians from high profile political families are the least likely to retreat from a policy stance.
Ruling out Reverse Causality. There may be a concern of reverse causality of our main results. We interpret the results as weak political status of the politician leads to greater likelihood of firms being renationalized. Alternatively, one may think that party officials without connections to the dominant factions are more likely to be assigned to provinces with struggling privatized firms and worse labor markets. This is quite unlikely based on the experience of President Hu Jintao: he was the party secretary of Guizhou and Tibet, two of the most economically backward provinces, before being promoted to Beijing. Nonetheless, to rule out this possible reverse causality, we use an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the provincial party secretary has no connection to any of the three groups, and 0 otherwise, as the dependent variable in Table 4 , and run a Probit regression with similar controls as in Table 2 , capturing firm-level performance (we use the average of each variable of the firms located in a province) and provincial level variables. Based on the results reported in Table 4 , we do not see any of the firm-level or provincial-level variables to be correlated with the political status of the party secretary. We conclude that reverse causality discussed here is unlikely to explain our results.
More robustness checks.
We conduct a number of robustness checks on the determinants of re-nationalization. To save space, we only report the coefficients of interest-the variables measuring the political status of the officials in Table 5 . First, since the frequencies of re-nationalization can be affected by different time trends across regions, we add interaction terms between the year and regional indicators to our baseline regression specified in Eq. (1). We continue to find similar results (column 1). Second, we use different definitions of "renationalization" regarding the threshold of increased government ownership stakes. More specifically, we consider a firm to be re-nationalized in year t if the government share increases by at least 10% (column 2) or if the government share increase from less than 50% to larger than 50%
(column 3). With these alternative definitions we obtain very similar results. Fourth, we employ alternative definitions of factional affiliations. Following Shih et al.
(2012), we include an official's social networks (e.g., alumni relations with the faction leader) in addition to his/her working experience to determine factional affiliation. We report qualitatively similar estimate is found, although the magnitude is smaller (column 4). (2015) and Persson and Zhuravskaya (2016) , where variation in the central leadership is used to identify the strength of political connection of local politicians in China. Using this new definition of factional affiliation, we continue to obtain similar results (column 5) with weaker magnitude.
Economic and Political Effects
In Table 6 we examine the effects of re-nationalization on firm performance. We first estimate the following fixed effect model:
The dependent variables are Labor Redundancy (measured as the log of number of employees over sales or over value-added), Profitability (return on sales), Total Factor Productivity (including measures of TFP estimated with three methods), and Leverage (total debt over total asset). Post-renationalization i,t is a dummy variable which equals one if a firm has been renationalized. γ i and ρ t are firm and year fixed effects, respectively. The results are reported in Panel A.
In order to further control unobservable differences between firms which experienced renationalization and other firms, we try to add more controls.
Specifically, we add industry-specific year fixed effects to allow for industry-specific shock. To allow for different shocks between firms renationalized (treatment group) and not renationalized (control group), we add group-specific year fixed effects. We also add the interaction terms of initial firm-level characteristics 7 and year dummies, to control for the time effects of such characteristics on the outcome variables. The results are reported in Panel B.
As discussed before, re-nationalization is not an exogenous event, and hence we also use a 2SLS procedure and an instrument to deal with the potential endogeneity problem. It is unlikely that at the initiation of a factional relationship, an official would choose the faction in anticipation that the leader of his/her faction would eventually become the supreme leader of the Party many years later: the median of the interval between an official's initiation of a factional association and his/her first year as a provincial party secretary is 15 years for the Shanghai group and 20 years for the Youth League group. We thus use whether a provincial leader is affiliated with a political faction as instrument.
We follow Wooldridge (2007) and fit a probit model with
Post-renationalization i,t as the dependent variable, we then use the fitted probabilities from this model as an instrument for Post-renationalization i,t in a 2SLS estimation.
The probit model is as follows:
The first stage regression model (3a) is the same as our previous Probit model specified in Eq. (1) 
The second stage (3b) affect the performance of a specific local firm. In Table 4 , we have already shown that a provincial leader's factional affiliation is not related to the (average) performance of firms in the province. In addition, we also want to rule out other possible channels through which officials' political status can affect firm performance. For example, connected politicians may receive more financial support from the central government, which could in turn help improve firm performance in the province. To test this, we regress the total amount of fiscal transfers a province receives from the central government in a given year (scaled by the provincial fiscal revenue) on the provincial leader's political factional indicator and other controls in Table 7 . Again, we do not find that a politician's factional affiliation affects the amount of transfers the province receives from the central government. Based on the above tests, we conclude that the political indicators satisfy the exclusion restriction, and serve as valid instruments for re-nationalization in our study of the effects of re-nationalization on firm performance.
Economic consequences. From Table 6 , we observe that renationalization has a negative impact on firm performance: the profitability and TFP of a renationalized firm fall after the local government regains ownership stakes as compared to the year before re-nationalization, than the control firms. Renationalization also raises labor redundancy and firm leverage, which suggests that the government interferes with the layoff process and by injecting more bank loans to the ill-performing firm. Putting together the results, we have shown that renationalization is a sub-optimal economic policy. The decision is made in part to protect the politician from being affected by negative social consequences. While temporarily halting the trend of unemployment, the economic impact of renationalization is negative and runs contrary to the central government's aim to maintain a high economic growth.
Political incentives.
We have demonstrated that a politician's factional affiliation has profound impacts on his/her ability to adhere to an economic policy. To further explore the political incentives behind this behavior, we examine the determinants of promotion by estimating the following model:
where the dependent variable Promotedi is a dummy which equals one if the party secretary i during the renationalization sample period 1999~2007 got a seat in the Politburo by 2012, the recent National Congress of the CCP. The key explanatory variables are the politician's political status and economic indicators of the province.
We control for province fixed effects and year fixed effects. Column 1 of Table 8 shows that regional economic growth enhances the politician's promotion prospectus, consistent with the literature on career concerns of Chinese local officials. Not surprisingly, unemployment works in the opposite direction. When we add the politician's political status to the regression in Column 2, we can see that politicians
with NO factional affiliations are disadvantaged in the promotion competition, after controlling for economic growth and unemployment. Column 3 further disaggregates factional ties into detailed classification and shows that being affiliated with one of the three main factions helps one's promotion, with the Youth League group displaying a weaker effect. Growth and stability may have different impact on different politicians, and we interact the factional affiliation with both GDP growth and unemployment in Column 4. While the interaction term between GDP growth and
No Faction is insignificant, the interaction term between unemployment and No
Faction is negative and significant. The results suggest that high unemployment would amplify the disadvantage of those politicians without strong factional support, and that high economic growth may not mitigate the issue.
Conclusions
The Chinese government has played an important role in the transition from a central planning economy to a mixture of market-based and government-controlled sectors and has been hailed as a successful model of benevolent autocracy. Some have even suggested that a "Beijing Consensus" is replacing the "Washington Consensus"
of the World Bank and IMF (Halper, 2010) partly because China boasts of "an army of great ideas and successful implementation" (Ramo, 2004) .
With a large sample of firms from thirty provinces across China during the period 1998-2007, we document, for the first time in the literature, large-scale reversals of privatization: local governments regain ownership stakes in a quarter of previously privatized firms. The reversal of the policy agenda is closely related to China's political structure: we find that party secretaries without strong support are more concerned about protecting their status by introducing policies that can lead to immediate, 'desirable' social outcomes such as lower unemployment rates at the cost of long-run inefficiencies. Following prior research, we classify three dominant and distinct factions within the Party that have been in existence for the past two decades, and identify each provincial leader's affiliation with the factions. We find that firms located in provinces with party leaders who do not belong to any of the three dominant political factions are more likely to be re-nationalized. Renationalization leads to economic consequences that the Chinese government has been trying to avoid:
reduction in productivity and increases in labor redundancy and leverage. The distortion fits well with the power structure in an autocracy: politicians without factional affiliations experience a smaller likelihood of promotion and their political fate hinges more on discouraging social unrest than on making economic achievement.
Our results shed new light on how political structure and politicians shape economic policies, and in particular, how incentives of politicians can affect firms' organization structure and performance. By analyzing the determinants and consequences of renationalization, we show that the seemingly efficient top-down system in an autocracy is constrained by its Byzantine nature.
Going forward, many scholars have called for another reform in China, from the state-led, investment intensive, export-oriented economy, which may have reached a tipping point, to one relying much more on domestic consumption and private sectors'
production (see, e.g., World Bank, 2012) . Under this new model, privately owned firms will play an increasingly more significant role, and more supportive policies and regulations are needed to help grow private sectors and allow them to compete with SOEs on an even playing ground. However, the built-in distortions in China's autocratic system may explain the recent stagnation in its market-oriented reforms and the massive build-up of debt. This table reports additional Probit regression results on the determinants of re-nationalization. The dependent variable takes on the value of 1 if a firm is re-nationalized in year t, and 0 otherwise. We report marginal probabilities evaluated at the mean of the variables. We include but do not report coefficients on firm-level and provincial-level controls, as well as industry, province and year indicators. Standard errors are clustered at the province level, and t-statistics are in the brackets below the coefficients. In Column 1, we add interaction terms between the year and regional (western, middle and eastern) dummies to our baseline regression specified in Eq.
(1), in order to control possible region-specific trends. In Column 2, a firm is re-nationalized in year t if the government share increased by at least 10%. In Column 3, a firm is re-nationalized in year t if the government share increased by less than 50% to more than 50%. In Column 4, No Faction takes on the value of 1 if a provincial leader belongs to a political faction as classified by Shih et al. (2012) . In Column 5, No Faction takes on the value of 1 if a provincial leader belongs to a strong political faction. 
Table 6. Effects of Renationalization on Firm Performance
We report the impact of re-nationalization on firm performance. The variable Re-nationalized, which is 1 if the firm is re-nationalized, is instrumented by the fitted probabilities obtained from a first-stage Probit model, which has Re-nationalized as the dependent variable and is reported in Panel B. The dependent variables in Panel A are changes in profitability, productivity and employment from one year before to one year after re-nationalization. We use three methods to estimate total factor productivity (TFP). The first is estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS). We call this TFP-OLS. The second is by the method proposed by Olley and Pakes (1996) . We call this TFP-OP. The third method relies on the estimates of the factor shares at the two-digit industry level from Bentolila and Saint-Paul (2003) , as in Bloom et al. (2012) . We call this TFP-Index number. The control group is privatized firms that have not been re-nationalized during that period. In Panel A, we also report first stage F-test statistics of excluded instruments of the first stage probit regression to validate that the fitted probability is a strong IV for Re-nationalized. The variables in the first-stage Probit model but excluded from the performance regressions (in Panel A) Note： *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels. 
Figure 2. Incidences of Re-nationalization over Incidences of Privatization
The graph displays the ratio: the number of firms that are re-nationalized / the number of firms that are privatized in each year over the period 2000-2007. 0 500
